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1. Introduction  
 
Nowadays, robotics is a rapidly increasing industry producing new 
developments year after year. In 2007, Bill Gates observed: “The emergence of 
the robotics industry is developing in the same way that the computer business 
did 30 years ago” (Lin 2014, 1). Those robots already clean our houses, mow 
our lawns, hunt terrorists or transport heavy loads weighing up to 1.000 kg. 
Over the course of the last few years, robot usage in society has expanded 
enormously and they now carry out a remarkable number of tasks for us. In 
every industrial sector, it is likely that there are at least a handful of jobs for 
human workers that will sooner or later be replaced by robots or autonomous 
solutions (Lin 2014, 1). 
 
Currently, robots are mostly tasked with duties that are seen as non-value 
adding, exceptionally dull or even dangerous. They are considered as means to 
support and substitute human workers where those are handicapped or 
limited. For instance, automobile factory robots execute the same, repetitive 
assemblies again and again 24 hours a day without any break, with precision 
and perfection; military unmanned aerial vehicles surveil and control from the 
skies for far more hours than a human pilot can endure at a time. In logistics, 
robots carry packages, palettes and barrels through difficult, complex areas 
with reliability and precision and collaborate with human workers. Without 
any fear of danger or risk, they also explore volcanoes, travel to Mars, secure 
contaminated sites and defuse bombs. It is not surprising that, four years ago, 
Linda Johansson noted in her Doctoral thesis: “We read about them (robots) in 
the newspapers almost every day. (…) When we make a phone call to a 
company and get to talk to a computer, it seems like the world is becoming 
more and more automated” (Johansson 2013, 1). 
 




Linked with the rise of robotics is the question of morality. As robots 
become more autonomous1 (Johansson 2013, 1), it perhaps becomes plausible 
to assign responsibility to the robot itself rather than its creator, especially if it 
is able to meet with most of the features that typically define personhood. A 
popular scenario frequently quoted by moralists illustrates the dilemma: If a 
human driver causes an accident, the driver has to face the consequences of his 
carelessness. He is responsible for what he has done. But if it was the car 
driving autonomously without any human interference, the situation is 
different. And what if an accident is unavoidable and the car has to decide 
whether to save the passengers in it or uninvolved people on the street (Bendel 
2013)? 
 
The philosopher Bertram F. Malle therefore calls for a debate of moral 
competence in robots. As he puts it: Any robot that collaborates with, looks after 
or helps humans is a social robot that must have moral competence. He 
outlines moral competence as a functional system of five cognitive abilities that 
seems to put machines on the same level as humans. Starting with a short 
introduction to robot morality, I will analyse Malle’s five components of moral 
competence and will discuss in how far his approach tangles with common 
ideas of personhood.  
2. Robot Morality  
 
Robot morality, or, as it is correctly called, robot ethics is a very young 
discipline. Many authors yet criticize that it does not have a specific object of 
research due to ethics normally addressing animated matter such as animals or 
humans (Loh 2017, 22). However, most are willing to admit that ecosystems, 
cars, houses, smartphones and a range of various other entities have a value.  
 
The term “robot” originally refers to the Czech word “robota”, meaning 
work and compulsory labour and was introduced by the artist Josef Čapek in 
1920. In his play “Rossum’s Universal Robots” (1921), his brother Karel Čapek 
spoke about “labori” for humanoid equipment serving humans to ease their 
work. Literature gives many definitions of what robots are. But generally, it can 
be agreed that typically, a robot uses sensors to detect aspects of an external 
world, software to reason about it, and actuators to interact with it. We can 
thus define robots as a branch of engineering that deals with autonomous 
machines (Abney & Veruggio 2014, 349-50).  
 
                                                             
1 The term „autonomous” is not defined by exact definition. Being autonomous is linked 
with the basic idea to have the ability to be off on one’s own, making decisions of one’s 
own, without the influence of someone else.  
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Generally, Robot ethics discuss the questions if robots do have a moral 
value and in which way they can be seen as a moral subject. It discusses the 
question of which components are essential for moral agency and what moral 
code we want to programme into them somehow (Abney & Veruggio 2014, 
347). Say it becomes necessary to write software for an autonomous robot 
collaborating with us in a certain context, then we must decide which moral 
values ought to be followed by it and which ones it does not need. This decision 
will enable humans to judge whether the robot acts morally, in that it either 
obeys its programmed moral code and does what it ought to do, or acts 
immorally, doing something it is not supposed to do, be it because of an 
electromechanical glitch, or a bug in its software. Finally, Robotic ethics ask 
how we as human beings should treat robots and what it means if we act 
“unfair” towards them. In which industrial sector or society area do we want 
artificial support: In medicine and healthcare, in military, in research and 
education or in waste management (Johansson 2013, 67-82)?  
 
Robot ethics can be approached by examining two categories: robots as 
moral patients and robots as moral agents (Loh 2017, 22). The first category 
considers robots as passive holders of moral rights, functioning as objects of 
moral responsibility of moral agents. Moral attitudes such as concern, respect, 
or care can be directed at moral patients and moral agents can have moral 
responsibilities towards them. In this understanding of moral actors, all moral 
agents are also moral patients, but moral patients need not to be moral agents. 
It is only the moral agent who is an active holder of moral obligations and 
responsibilities (Winston 2008). Analysing robots as part of the first category 
(as moral patients), robot ethics mainly asks about the correct human 
behaviour when it comes to their application. In this case, artificial systems are 
predominantly understood as tools or technical supplements for humans. 
Analysing robots as part of the second category (as moral agents), scientist 
refer to them as subjects having the individual’s ability to make moral 
judgements based of some simple notion of what is right or wrong. Here, Malle 
criticizes that many scholars mix up moral agency with moral competence 
(Malle 2014, 189). In his opinion, moral competence goes further, as we will 
see in the next chapter.  
3. Moral Competence  
 
Thanks to Lawrence Kohlberg and Georg Lind, a lot of research has been 
conducted on the term “moral competence” over the course of the last few 
years. Kohlberg defines moral competence as the cognitive ability to make 
judgments and decisions that are based on internal moral principles, and to act 
in accordance with such judgments (Kohlberg 1964, 425). Lind on the other 




hand states: “moral competence is the ability to resolve problems and conflicts 
on the basis of inner moral principles through deliberation and discussion 
instead of violence and deceit” (Lind 2016, 13).  
Taking one step back, the word competence originates from the Latin 
word competentia, which in post-classical Latin was combined with the 
meaning of “meeting together” or “agreement”, but it also stems from 
competere, which means to compete or rival (Malle 2014, 189). We see that the 
word competence is set in between contrasts: namely competition and 
cooperation. In common sense, competence is considered an aptitude, a 
qualification, a dispositional capacity to deal adequately with certain tasks 
(Malle 2014, 189). 
According to Malle, moral competence is a set of five components: (i) a 
system of norms, (ii) a moral vocabulary, (iii) moral cognition and affect, (iv) 
moral decision making and action, (v) moral communication. Following his 
interpretation, we can speak of moral competence only if all of these criteria 
are fulfilled. Hence, Malle’s main argument resembles general theories of 
functionalists (Beckermann 2001, 143-45) who usually put their arguments in 
the same logical way, saying: If a subject or system is in a certain state (a), and 
something (internal or external) is added to the subject or system, state (a) will 
change into state (b). A popular example for this is a vending machine. If the 
vending machine is in a certain state (a) and someone inserts money, the 
vending machine ejects a can. Transferring it to our case of moral competence: 
If a robot is added all five essentials, it will be in a state that would allow us to 
call it morally competent. Like many functionalists, Malle believes we can treat 
cognitive abilities as a phenomenon that is not only reserved for humans, but 
is something we can implement into a machine as complex software, once we 
know how it works.  
3.1 A system of norms 
The philosopher Immanuel Kant defined morality as compliance with 
universally valid moral principles instead of a simple list of prohibitions and 
commandments for behaviour. To him, moral principles were maxims of 
actions that we would wish to be universally valid and applied (Lind 2016, 61). 
We act morally if our behaviour coincides with our principles. Malle seems to 
agree with Kant’s point of view that morality is necessary to regulate human 
social living. He believes that human communities perform this regulation by 
motivating and deterring certain behaviours through the imposition of norms 
(Malle 2014, 190). 
 
Thus, the first essential characteristic of moral competence is a system 
of norms, although there are still many unanswered questions in human 
psychology about those. For instance, we do not know exactly how norms are 
acquired or represented in the human mind, what properties they have that 
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allow them to be so context-sensitive and mutually adjusting. Regarding the 
development of norms, it is known that children are able to express concrete 
moral judgements (Wright & Bartsch 2008, 56-85): “What you have done was 
wrong! This is not nice.” However, children also easily induce more general 
rules from concrete instances, such as “bombs hurt people” (Malle 2014, 190). 
Malle points out that norms function like goal concepts somewhat, which 
can typically be found in robot architectures. Depending on the robot, on a very 
simple level, goals provide the robot with parameters, for instance where to go, 
what to carry and generally what to do. Malle further suggests that moral 
norms require a more complex goal definition. A norm needs to have the quality 
of representations and value as he follows Jon Elster’s opinion that “social 
norms provide an important kind of motivation for action that is irreducible to 
rationality or indeed any other form of optimizing mechanism” (Elster 1989, 
15). But if we understand how representations are constituted in the human 
mind and how contextual activities allow us to detect norm violations, Malle is 
convinced that it is possible to build computed norm systems.  
Malle puts this very simply. Neurosciences, biology and philosophy yet 
struggle to find a convincing concept of the mind and are far from answering 
fundamental epistemic questions such as if representations are really internal 
or external.2 But this question is important before we start with technical 
development of norm systems in robots. And, apart from that, we must ask: 
What set of norms do we implement? Do we use all existing human norms on 
the planet, or do we evaluate country by country?  
3.2 Moral vocabulary  
The second essential ingredient needed for a human or robot to be 
morally competent is a steady moral vocabulary. Malle’s premise is that a norm 
system demands language for learning it, using it, and negotiating it. In terms of 
humans, he might be right. But why would we have to implement an entire 
human language in a machine? Why not use simple binary code? Why should 
we implement millions of words with millions of connotations into a robot 
when a binary code is more precise? This huge expanse is only comprehensible 
if we intend to set up communication based on human abilities.  
Malle introduces three categories of moral vocabulary: Vocabulary of 
norms and their properties (“fair,” “virtuous,” “reciprocity,” “honesty,” 
“obligation,” “prohibited,” “ought to,” etc.); Vocabulary of norm violations 
(“wrong,” “culpable,” “reckless,” “thief,” but also “intentional,” “knowingly,” etc.); 
Vocabulary of responses to violations (“blame,” “reprimand,” “excuse,” 
“forgiveness,” etc.). In each domain, there are numerous distinctions and 
differentiations.  
                                                             
2 I am referring here mainly to the philosophical debates labelled internalism and 
externalism, as well the whole philosophical school of “New Realism” around Markus 
Gabriel, which is trying to answer similar questions (Searle 1998; Roth 2007).  




Let us assume Malle was right and we were able to create a robot with 
moral German, English or Polish vocabulary, then how do we guarantee that it 
uses words and sentences in the same way we do? Especially since moral 
vocabulary is highly influenced by current culture, society and history?  
3.3 Moral cognition and affect  
Moral vocabulary on one hand and a moral norm system on the other 
hand are not enough to explain why we call an incident bad or good and say 
that anyone deserves blame or praise. So what psychological processes are 
involved in detecting and responding to norm violations? Malle distinguishes 
between two types of moral judgements: events (outcomes, behaviours) and 
agents. He is correct in that the key difference between the two forms is mainly 
the amount of information processing that normally underlies each judgment 
(Malle 2014, 192). An event judgement merely demands that we register that a 
norm has been violated. If an agent has done something wrong, we usually take 
the agent’s specific causal involvement, intentionality, and mental states into 
account. 
 
Nevertheless, registering that an event violated a norm is not as simple as it 
seems. For instance, if a robot sees a police officer killing a dangerous criminal 
or terrorist, it must be capable of distinguishing that this action was necessary 
even though it violates the norm to never harm anyone. This situation becomes 
more complex if a robot has to consider intentions and reasons of the agent. 
The robot therefore has to understand that many human actions are based on 
reasons. Unfortunately, Malle puts only a small spotlight on emotions in moral 
judgement. It was the remarkable work of Daniel Kahneman who demonstrated 
in many experiments that most human judgment works intuitively and 
emotionally (Kahneman 2011). Malle briefly discusses the role of affects, but 
concludes that it is not an important factor for the creation of a morally acting 
robot (Malle 2014, 193). 
3.4 Decision making and action 
A fourth element required for moral competence is decision making. 
Malle mainly limits the debate to two psychological terms: empathy and self-
regulation. He says that an action becomes moral by the involvement of socially 
shared norms and individual goals. For instance, it can be the individual goal of 
an autonomous bus to save its passengers. But if the bus is suddenly involved in 
an unavoidable accident, it must decide whom it should save: the people in the 
car or the people on the street. The bus has to make a moral decision depending 
on what is right or wrong.  
Malle is misleading when he thinks he can avoid this problem in 
designing a robot without any self-regulation and awareness of community 
benefits. Of course, it depends on what is understood by the word “self-
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regulation”. According to Malle, self-regulation is all about being self-interested 
and cold, ignoring other’s needs or building trust (Malle 2014, 194). This is, I 
think, a false and very human idea of robots. Right now, robots already calculate 
their position, battery status, routes and duties and coordinate all data with 
other robots. What makes Malle so sure that they are unable to solve problems 
in cooperation?  
We see that Malle’s position is contradictory. On one hand he believes 
that robots can act reasonably, on the other hand he is concerned that robots 
can’t handle self-regulation (following its own goals) and community values at 
the same time.  
3.5 Moral communication 
Finally, moral competence is a matter of communication. If we want to 
regulate other people’s behaviour, we need to express what we wish to 
regulate. The same is true for robots. If someone has made a mistake and 
violated a norm, we blame them for their decision. Blame in this case functions 
as a social act to inform, correct and provide an opportunity to learn (Malle, 
Guglielmo & Monroe 2014, 147-186). I agree with Malle in that robots can 
change and learn, and that, if they can make decisions by themselves, they 
become be appropriate targets of blame. In this case a robot is in the same 
position as any other agent. It can come up with and express moral judgements 
and can therefore also be accused.  
Furthermore, moral competence requires the ability to explain immoral 
behaviour (typically one’s own, but also sometimes others’). Thus, an essential 
question is how robots are to access their own intentional behaviour and 
reasoning. Will they be able to know their desires and beliefs in light of which 
and on the ground of which they decided to act? And if robots become 
autonomous on such a high level of social behaviour, is it likely that robots 
might not always truthfully report their internal reasons of their actions? After 
all, if they have to follow a superior norm or value, they could decide to hide 
their true intentions and lie to us.  
4. Conclusion: Are Machines People?   
 
The last chapter already illustrates the core problem of Malle’s whole 
futuristic theory. Despite all my objections and doubts, his idea of moral 
competence raises the question if machines can someday be understood as 
people. To make this point clear, I will shortly summarize the key 
characteristics of personhood, before I explain my position. Generally, 
personhood or a person is characterized by his or her individual properties. 
The word originates from the Latin word persona, meaning singularity, 
uniqueness and individuality.  




The philosophical literature on this subject is very extensive. Dieter 
Sturma for example claims that, as the term has many different meanings, it 
should be difficult to define it with absolute precision in one exact definition. He 
points out that a person is someone who lives their life self-determinedly, 
making moral decisions and following individual plans, ideas and beliefs. 
(Sturma 1997, 348). On the other hand, Harry G. Frankfurt states that a person 
is a special entity whose existence is more profound than their biological 
happenstance. A person has the capacity to properly identify with their desires 
and has a will. A person can reflect on their inner wishes, reasons and 
motivations (Frankfurt 1971, 6). Finally, the constitution of personhood 
depends on community and the presence of others. It was the German 
philosopher F. W. J. Schelling who pointed out that a person demands the 
presence of another person. „Und so ist es auch das Ich, welches als selbst 
Persönliches Persönlichkeit verlangt, eine Person fordert (…) ein Herz, das ihm 
gleich sey“ (Sturma 2015, 67).3 In the presence of other people, we become 
aware of our own individual qualities, behaviour and self-interests and learn to 
coordinate and communicate them in community.  
 
Unsurprisingly, we see that Malle’s concept of moral competence 
matches with a majority of characteristics usually attributed to a person. This 
means that, if we follow Malle’s theory, we have to think about its 
consequences, too. If a machine acted autonomously and was able to make its 
own decisions, had access to its reasons and intentions, was able to blame and 
correct its environment, why shouldn’t we treat a machine as a person? Malle 
doesn’t give a proper answer here. He rather concentrates on the issue of how 
we should integrate robots in society (Malle 2015, 19). But it is not enough to 
consider only the ethical implications at this point. We have to think about 
robot personality or personhood, too. For instance, if machines were on the 
same moral level as humans, would they have the same rights and obligations 
like us? Or should we treat machines differently? Malle answers this question 
somehow contradictory. On one hand, he can’t deny that robots should have 
moral standing. On the other hand, he explicates that their rights maybe 
limited, however, and vary as a function of their value and specific role in 
society. If a robot met all five elements of Malle’s moral competence, I believe 
we would have no other choice but to accept its personality. Nevertheless, this 
raises new philosophical questions: Will human personality and robot 
personality be the same? How will robots experience their personality? What 
does it mean for a robot’s personality that it doesn’t age? And if a robot died, 
would it have the same meaning as the death of a human being? Rob Sparrow 
puts it this way: “Machines will be people when we can’t let them die without 
                                                             
3 Unfortunately, the original source of this Schelling quotation – written in the essay 
„Dartellung der reinrationalen Philosophie” - is not yet published.  
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facing the same moral dilemma that we would when thinking about letting a 
human being die” (Sparrow 2014, 307). 
 
To sum, although Malle’s approach is very unique and innovative, it is 
insufficient. The nature of his main argument, treating moral competence like 
software we can easily implement into a robot, is putting a complex subject too 
simply. Therefore, every component of his concept is linked with new 
questions and problems and in the end confronts us with the challenging 
question of personhood in machines. I believe that Malle’s thoughts aim in the 
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Robot Morality: Bertram F. Malle’s Concept of Moral Competence 
 
Abstract: Bertram F. Malle is one of the first scientists, combining robotics with 
moral competence. His theory outlines that moral competence can be 
understood as a system of five components including moral norms, a moral 
vocabulary, moral cognition, moral decision making and moral communication. 
Giving a brief (1) introduction of robot morality, the essay analyses Malle’s 
concept of moral competence (2) and discusses its consequences (3) for the 
future of robot science. The thesis will further argue that Malle’s approach is 
insufficient due to three reasons: his function argument is very simplifying and 
therefore troubling; each component of his theory is inconsistent and, finally, 
closely connected to our common understanding of personhood, which raises 
new philosophical questions surrounding the basic issue of if and/or when 
machines can be considered people. 
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